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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IDA AND JAMES WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
-vs.-
ZION COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE 
INSTITUTION, 
Defendant and Respondent. 




This appeal is from a judgment of dismissal with 
prejudice at the close of plaintiff's case. 
Throughout this brief plaintiff and appellant, Ida 
Williams, will be referred to as plaintiff and the defend-
and and respondent, Zions Cooperative Mercantile In-
stitution, will be referred to as defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The basis of defendant's nwtion was that the evi-
dence conclusively shows plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law (R. 66). It w.as stipulated 
that the plaintiff, James Willian1s, be granted judgment 
against the defendant for the sum of $157.40 and costs. 
The cause of action of plaintiff arose out of .a colli-
sion which occurred on the 5th day of February, 1953 at 
about 3 :25 P.M. at the intersection of "B" Street and 
Third Avenue in Salt Lake City. 
Plaintiff was driving a 1947 four door .sedan in a 
southerly direction. As she .approached the intersection 
while at a point about 25 feet north of the intersection 
she s.aw a panel truck owned by defendant stopped at the 
stop sign prO'tecting "B" Street fron1 traffic going east 
on Third Avenue (R. 49, 50, 51). She then looked to the 
east and proceeded through the intersection (R. 60). 
No movement on the part of the truck at the .stop sign 
was ever observed by plaintiff ( R. 59). After plaintiff 
had started into the intersection, ·when her car was about 
twenty-five feet fr01n the panel tnwk, it suddenly pulled 
out into the intersection (R. 63, 65). The defendant's 
truck struck the right side of the plaintiff's aut01nobile 
at the right front door and 1niddle post on the right side. 
At the moment of the impact plaintiff was driving about 
20 miles per hour (H. 63, 64). •'B" Street is approxi-
mately 40 feet in width and Third Avenue slightly nar-
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rower. Both streets ac0omrnodate only two lanes of 
traffic at the intersection (R. 58, 59). 
As a result of the collision plaintiff suffered injury 
and damage to her back and left side. The automobile 
in which she wa,s riding careened off from the collision 
and stopped at a point in the gutter on the east side of 
"'B'' Street. 
Frmn judgment that she was contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law, plaintiff prosecutes this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF 




THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT. 
The Trial Court held that plaintiff had a duty even 
though she was on a street protected by stop signs to 
continuously watch the automobile which had stopped for 
the intersection and avoid in every event any movement 
by such automobile. 
Section 41-6-74 U.C.A. 1953 covers intersections and 
reads as follows: 
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"The driver of a vehicle shall stop .as re-
quired by this act at the entrance to a through 
highway and shall yield the right-of-way to other 
vehicles which have entered the intersection from 
said through highway or which are approaching 
so closely on said through highway .as to consti-
tute an immediate hazard, but said driver having 
so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all 
other vehicles approaching the intersection on said 
through highway shall yield the right-of-way to 
the vehicle so proceeding into or across the 
through highway." 
Plaintiff saw defendant's panel truck stopped at 
the stop sign when she was twenty-five feet from the 
intersection. Concerning the relative positions of the 
vehicles in the intersection, plaintiff and the witness, 
Singleton, testified: 
"A. Well, on nty way horne I was going south on 
B Street. I saw the-there is a stop sign ther2 
on Third Avenue, and I sa\v this Z. C. !I. I. 
panel truck standing there as I was on my 
way traveling south, you know, to on my way 
home, and I thought that the truck was stand-
ing there with time for n1e to pass. He were 
standing there. I saw it. 
Q. Did you proceed through the intersection'? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Now, did you ever, :J[ rs. \Yilliams, see the 
panel truck start up frmn the stop sign~ 
A. No. 
Q. What brought to your attention the f.act that 
the truck had left the stop sign~ 
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A. When Mrs. Singleton screamed. 
Q. And then what happened~ 
A. The impact." (R. 13) 
"Q. Mrs. Williams, approximately what speed 
were you proceeding as you came through the 
intersection of B Street and Third Avenue¥ 
A. Oh, not fast. 
Q. Can you give us some idea of about how fast! 
A. Oh, about twenty-five miles an hour maybe. 
Q. Now, as you proceeded through the intersec-
tion, did you see any other traffic in the inter-
section or near it~ 
A. No. 
Q. Let me ask you if you looked for other traffic. 
A. I did. 
Q. What direction did you look, Mrs. Williams? 
A. I looked to the east and west." (R. 15-16) 
"Q. I want you to give me your best recollection 
how far away you were when you saw it7 
A. I would say about twenty-five feet. 
Q. North of the intersection 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. At that time this truck was stopped at the 
stop sign, was it not 7 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you ever look again to see what happened 
to that truck until after the accident~ 
A. No." (R. 50) 
* * * * 
"A. No, Mr. Conder, after I saw the truck stand-
ing there, thinking he would stay there until 
I passed, then there wasn't any reason for 
me to keep watching him. If I had my head 
turned watching hin1 I could have ran into 
someone else. 
Q. (by Mr. Conder) You didn't watch him any-
time after that~ 
A. No. 
Q. How fast were you traveling~ 
A. Not fast, a;bout twenty miles an hour." (R. 51) 
* * * * 
"A. No I don't know how long I looked at it. 
Q. Were you proceeding during the time you 
looked at it in your direction to the south at 
the rate of twenty miles an hour~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. While you looked at that truck, Mrs. Williams, 
can you tell us any tin1e you were looking at 
it you observed it 1nake any movement what-
soever~ 
A. No." (R. 59-60) 
Witness Singleton 
"Q. As you .approached the intersection of B 
Stree1t and 3rd Avenue, tell what you ob-
served. 
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A. As we approached the intersection of B Street 
and 3rd A venue, there was a Z. C. M. I. truck 
standing at the stop sign. We proceeded to 
go on down and suddenly this truck pulled 
out into the intersection. 
Q. Where were you in the intersection when you 
saw the truck start to pull out 1 
MR. CONDER: I think that would be immaterial 
as far as this witness is concerned. 
THE COURT: I will let her answer. 
A. We hadn't got into it exactly. 
Q. (by Mr. King) Will you tell us what hap-
pened~ 
A. As we got into it, the truck came across 
around and I yelled to her to look out. 
Q. Did you notice what Mrs. Williams did when 
you yelled to her~ 
A. She started to swerve the car around to keep 
him from hitting her. 
Q. Was she .able to do that 1 
A. No. 
Q. What happened~ What happened then, Mrs. 
Shingleton~ 
A. After the car was struck, in fact before it was 
struck I yelled, as I said before, and we was 
struck and we got into the gutter, or ditch, 
or whatever it was, and a man got out. 
Q. What effect did the impact of the car have 1 
A. As the truck struck the car, it hit my side and 
threw me over to her. 
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Q. \Vhere was the car struck~ 
A. On the right. 
Q. Approxi1nately where on the right~ 
A. On the right door. 
Q. At the Inmnent of the impact, when it struck 
you, approximately how fast was the car of 
Mrs. Williams going~ 
:MR. CONDER: I object to an approximation. 
Q. (by Mr. King) Do you have an opinion how 
fast you were going at that time, ~Irs. Single-
ton~ 
A. About the same speed, she had never speeded 
up. 
Q. That would be how fast~ 
A. About twenty miles." (R. 63-64) 
:JI: :JI: :JI: :JI: 
"Q. About how far were you from the truck when 
it started to pull away~ 
A. About how far~ 
Q. Yes. 
MR. CONDER: I object to it, it should be an 
exact Ineasureinent, not an approximation. 
Q. (by l\Ir. l(ing) About how far, in your opin-
ion, was the truck fr01n :.Mrs. \Villiam's car 
when the truck started to pull out~ 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled, you 
Inay answer. 
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A. I imagine about twenty-five feet." (R. 65) 
There is no ( tnestion about the negligence of the 
driver of the defendant's autmnobile. He left the stop 
sign at a time wh2n the autmnobile driven by plaintiff 
watJ obviously so close as to constitute an immediate 
hazard. 
The basic question presented by this appeal is did 
the plaintiff have the duty to continue to keep her eye 
on the stopped vehicle which was in .a place of safety and 
did not appear to constitute a traffic hazard to her or 
could she look to the e~ast and then turn and watch in the 
direction in which she was driving without further ob-
servation to the west. A correlative question also pre-
sented is what could plaintiff have done even if she had 
seen the defendant start up into the intersection. 
That plaintiff submits that under the facts and cir-
cunlstances of this case there could not be presented a 
purely legal question. At Inost it is a question of fact 
whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 
The general law seems to be clear. It is stated in 
Volume 5A American Jurisprudence, page 686, section 
712. 
"A driver who makes reasonable observation 
before entering an intersection i.s not contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law for failing to 
make additional observation. When it appears 
to be s.afe to cross an intersection, an automobile 
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driver's contributory negligence in the light of 
the defendant's unanticipated speed or other negli-
gence is for the jury. 
"Clearly, however, the fact that the plaintiff 
proceeded into or across an inter.section with the 
traffic signal or sign in his favor ordinarily pre-
cludes finding hun guilty of such negligence as a 
matter of law, and he is sometimes held free of 
contributory negligence .as a rnatter of law in such 
circumstance.s." 
See also: Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 
and Practice, Volurne 10, Part 2, Section 6619 P. 10-17, 
and 1956 Cumulative Pocket Part, No. 6619, P. 7-20. 
The general rule, which is recited by American Juris-
prudence and by Blashfield has been on numerous occa-
sions reeognized and cited by this court in its interseC-
tion cases. The most recent case which plaintiff has 
been able to discover is Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 
281 P. 2d 209. 
In the Bates case the question of negligence of a 
driver approaching a through highway on a disfavored 
highway was found by this Court to be a question of fact. 
Bates observed the autonw bile of the defendant ap-
proaching him at one hundred fifty feet on a through 
highway but since he had conunenced to cross the inter-
section he proceeded with the right-of-way in his favor. 
Certainly if Bates was not contributorily negligent as 
n1atter of law in proceeding aeross the through highway 
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watching other tr.affjc which 1night be in the vicinity, 
plaintiff, here, cannot be so held. She proceeded into the 
intersection after observing that the defendant was stop-
ped at the stop sign and apparently was waiting for her 
to cross. At t~12 ti:me she observed defendant, plaintiff 
y,ras obviously so close to the intersection as to constitute 
an imn1eC:i.ate hazard. Defendant pulled only a short way 
into the intersection and .struck the automobile of the 
plaintiff at the front door and towards the middle of the 
car. This would dernonstrate that plaintiff was over half 
way through the intersection before the defendant even 
moved. 
This Court has not had before it the exact f.acts 
which are the basis of the trial court's ruling. But on 
numerous occasions has had before it intersection colli-
sions which present a ruore difficult and closer question 
as far as contributory negligence is concerned. In the 
following cases this Court has .steadfastly held that in 
intersection collisions where tirne, distance, and other 
such important factors are rnatters of opinion and usually 
driver opinion the question of negligence and contribu-
tory negligence are matters which should be left for the 
jury to determine. See the following: Beck v. Jeppesen, 
1 Utah 2d 127, 262 P. 2d 760; Martin v. Stevens, ______ Utah 
______ , 243 P. 2d 747; Poulsen v. Manness, ______ Utah ______ , 
241 P. 2d 152; Lowder v. Hallen, 120 Utah 231, 233 P. 2d 
350; Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P. 2d 127. 
All of the cited eases denwnstrate the basic principal 
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that in intersection collisions the question.s of fact are 
so close and the application of standards of care are so 
nicely balanced that the jury must be left to apply the 
standards and determine the basic facts. 
There are several eases frorn jurisdiction other than 
Utah similar to the situation before the Court. One of 
the most interesting cases is Pollind v. Polich, 78 Cal. 
App. 2d 87, 177 P. 2d 63. In this case the person on the 
disfavored roadway observed the favored driver ap-
proaching approximately two hundred feet away. The 
question was whether or not the favored driver was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law in failing to ob-
serve the disfavored driver leave the stop sign and pro-
ceed into the intersection. The California Statute is 
similar to the Utah law quoted. The Court stated: 
"Defendant had a right to assume not only 
that the car in which plaintiff was riding would 
make the required stop at 43rd Street, until he ob-
served or, in the exercise of ordinary care, would 
have observed that the driver was not making a 
stop, but also that the Ford car would not enter 
the intersection in front of cars approaching so 
closely as to constitute an i1nmediate hazard. De-
fendant testified that he saw the Ford car ap-
proaching when it wa.s about 30 feet west of the 
intersection, but as he was passing the Pulliam car 
his view of the Ford was obstructed .as he ap-
proached the intersection, and that he assumed 
that Secrest, the Ford driver, would stop long 
enough to allow his car and the Pulliam car to 
pass through the intersection first. He also testi-
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fied that he next saw the Ford when it was about 
12 or 15 feet in front of him, but that he the de-
fendant, could not swerve to the right to avoid a 
collision because of the Pulliam car. Secrest testi-
fied that he saw the Pulliam car approaching but 
did not see that of defendant. It was clearly a 
question of f.act whether defendant was guilty of 
negligence in assuming that Secrest would not 
enter the intersection in front of his car and that 
of Pulliam, but would re1nain at the boulevard 
stop sign until the two cars had passed." (Pag8 
65) 
An additional authority directly at point concerning 
the duty of the person on a through highway is De Priest 
t:. City of Glendale, 74 Cal. App. 2d 464, 169 P. 2d 17. 
Here the plaintiff admittedly failed to maintain a con-
stant lookout as he approached the intersection and did 
not observe the car which came into collision with him. 
The California Court following the general rule again 
held that under the facts and circumstances the negli-
gence and contributory negligence were questions of fact 
for the jury to determine. 
One of the most important cases which seems to be 
directly in point is Mead v. Cochran, 184 F. 2d 579. This 
case involved an accident on the open highway. The de-
fendant left a stop sign after stopping and turned in 
front of the plaintiff's automobile. There was a collision. 
The hasic question was whether or not plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent .since his testimony indicated that 
he did not see the defendant's car at any time prior to 
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the impact. The Federal Circuit Court following the 
general rule held this was a question of fact to be sub-
mitted to the jury to apply the basic standards of care 
on the part of the driver of the automobile on the through 
highway. The following quote sets forth the facts and 
ruling: 
"Furthennore, plaintiff did testify that he 
looked to his left about 100 feet from the inter-
section, and that before reaching that point there 
were trees and bushes on his left along old Route 
40 which obstructed his view. Under the circum-
stances it might be that defendant's stationary 
car did not make a permanent mental impression 
upon the plaintiff. Defendant's automobile had 
been at a standstill at some point within 15 to 23 
feet distant from the pavement of new Route 40. 
Defendant suddenly started his automobile in mo-
tion, intending to cross the center line of New 
Route 40 and then s\ving to his left in order to 
proceed along it in a northeasterly direction. 
* * :I: * 
"-Under the facts of this case we believe that 
the question of contributory negligence wa_s a 
question of fact for the jury.'' (Page 581) 
In Foresman v. Pepin, 71 F. Supp. 772, affirmed 
161 F. 2d 872. Plaintiff approached on a through high-
way and observed that on her left the traffic on the high-
way was stopped, she then proceeded to cross through 
the intersection and did not look to the right to see the 
truck of defendant which was approaching and which 
ultin1ately cmne into collision with her. It was conceded 
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that if paintiff had looked to the right at the intersection 
she may have been able to avoid the collision with the 
truck owned by the defendant. The Federal District 
Court submitted the case to the jury. He overruled the 
motions for a new trial and was affirmed on appeal. 
Held that the contributory negligence of plaintiff w.as a 
question of fact for the jury. 
The discussion in the Foresman case concerns the 
normal habits of drivers who are on through highways 
and who cross intersections where other traffic is wait-
ing. Once a driver commits himself to a certain course 
of conduct, i.e., crossing the intersection, additional ob-
serv.ation may or may not be possible. The significance 
of the driver's actions in either causation or in applying 
the standards of care is for the jury to determine. It 
would be a very unusual situation if the driver could 
prevent collision should another vehicle enter the inter-
section after he had commenced the crossing. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the lookout which 
a person approaching an intersection on a through high-
way must make is dependent upon the surrounding cir-
cumstance.s. Whether the lookout is one which a reason-
ably prudent person would make must be left to the 
jury for its determination. Whether the making of addi-
tional observations would have prevented the collision is 
also a f.act question. The Trial Court erroneously de-
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tennined these fact questions as matter of law and his 
decision should be reversed. 
Respectively submitted, 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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